We show that, despite coordination in the quality level of the components that they provide, independent vertically-related (disintegrated) monopolists will provide products of lower quality level than a sole integrated monopolist. Further, the integrated monopolist achieves higher market coverage, higher consumer surplus, and higher profits. We establish these results for any distribution of preferences in the standard model of quality differentiation. Despite the lower quality, we also show that, for a wide class of cost functions, price will be higher in a market of independent vertically-related monopolists. All results are the effects of the interaction of double-marginalization, occurring in the market of independent monopolists, with the choice of quality.
Introduction
Many goods are composed of complementary components. In some of these, the quality of the composite good is the minimum of the qualities of the component parts. For example, a long distance phone call requires the use of long distance lines as well as local lines at the two terminating points. The fidelity of sound in such a phone call is the minimum of the qualities of the three services used. In .
E-mail address: neconomi@stern.nyu.edu; www: http: / / raven.stern.nyu.edu / networks / (M. Economides) such situations, if different links are owned by different firms (as in the post-AT&T-divestiture world), firms need to coordinate in the determination of the quality level of the composite good.
In this paper we examine the simple case in which there is only one composite good demanded. We compare the world where both links are owned by the same firm with the world where they are owned by separate entities (dual verticallyrelated disintegrated monopolists). As far as pricing is concerned, this comparison 1 has been done in the third chapter of Cournot (1927) . He found that dual monopolists are not able to appropriate the full benefits of a price reduction they initiate and therefore face in effect a more inelastic demand and quote higher prices than the sole vertically integrated monopolist. This phenomenon has been 2 known as ''double marginalization.'' The focus of this paper is the effect of double marginalization on the quality of the components and of the composite good.
When only the composite good is demanded and its quality is the minimum of the qualities of the components, there is no incentive for either of the dual monopolists to produce components of different qualities even in a non-cooperative setting; the integrated monopolist does the same. Thus, in both ownership structures, firms are coordinating the quality levels of the components. The interesting question is the differences in the coordinated level of quality across regimes. Put differently, what kind of distortion in the provision of quality does double marginalization create?
We show that, for any distribution of preferences, the dual monopolists produce components of lower quality than the integrated sole monopolist. Therefore, vertical disintegration has a significant adverse effect on quality provision, besides the known effect of price increase. This result can be explained in intuitive terms as follows: because of double marginalization, the impact of marginal improvements in quality on price is higher under dual ownership. Thus, independent monopolists can achieve the same strategic effects while providing lower quality and saving on costs.
We also show that market coverage, consumers surplus, and profits are all lower under vertical disintegration. We further show that, for a wide class of cost functions and any distribution of preferences, prices will be higher under dual ownership, despite the lower quality. Thus, vertical disintegration hurts consumers 3 through both higher prices and lower quality.
1 See also Sonnenschein (1968) . 2 Cournot uses a simultaneous price-setting game for complements that is very similar to the well-known simultaneous quantity-setting game for substitutes. Some later authors have used games of sequential choice with very similar results.
3 Note that this paper analyzes bilateral monopoly quality provision and compares it with the provision of quality by a single integrated firm. Thus, this paper does not discuss incentives for non-price discrimination that can arise, for example, in the present state of the telecommunications market in the United States when a bottleneck monopolist also provides the monopolized input to a competitive sector, as in Economides (1997) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the preference and cost structures. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium of a vertically integrated monopolist. Section 4 discusses the subgame-perfect equilibrium of two verticallyrelated disintegrated monopolists. In Section 5, we make comparisons on quality levels across ownership structures. In Section 6, we compare price levels at the full-fledged equilibria. Extensions are presented in Section 7. Section 8 contains concluding remarks.
Preferences and costs
Consider a market for good AB that is composed of components A and B combined in a 1:1 proportion. Suppose that the quality of the composite good is 4 the minimum of the quality levels of its components, q ; q 5 min(q ,q ). Let
each consumer have a different marginal willingness to pay for quality, so that the 5 utility of a consumer of type u is of A and B. We assume that both cost functions are increasing and convex in 9 9 9 9 9 9
Vertically integrated monopolist (sole ownership)
We first consider a vertically integrated monopolist who produces a single version of each component, A and B, and sells them as a single product AB. The willingness-to-pay of consumers depends on the quality of the composite good, which is the minimum of q and q . Since there is never a revenue gain associated A B with increasing a component's quality above the highest quality component with which it might be paired, and since component costs increase with quality, the monopolist will choose the same quality for both components, so that q 5 q 5 q .
A B
We assume that price discrimination is impossible; thus, the monopolist will * quote a single p for the good AB. The marginal consumer u , who is indifferent between buying or not buying AB, is defined by
*
All consumers of types u [ [u , 1] will purchase the good; thus the monopolist's demand is
7
The monopolist's profits are:
S A B
Although the choices of the integrated monopolist can be thought as taking place simultaneously, it is useful for the comparisons that we will be making below to consider them as sequential, with the quality choice preceding the price choice. Of course, breaking the optimization in two stages does not alter its 8 solution. In the second stage, the integrated monopolist chooses price so that 
Independent unintegrated monopolists (dual ownership)
We now consider the case when each component is produced by a different (independent) monopolist. The upstream monopolist produces A and the downstream monopolist produces B. They are sold at prices p and p , respectively, so A B that the composite good AB is available at price p 5 p 1 p . The composite good A B has quality q 5 min(q ,q ). All consumers with marginal willingness to pay for A B * * quality larger than u 5 p /q purchase the good, so that demand is D 5 1 2 F(u ), as before. Profits for the two firms are: 7 We use the subscript ''S'' for ''sole ownership'' by a monopolist of both components.
The second order condition,
puts a mild restriction on the acceptable distributions.
In the second stage, firms choose prices simultaneously. Firm A's profit maximization condition is
Firm B has an identical profit maximization condition with p substituted with p .
Thus, p 5 p 5 p / 2, and the profit maximization conditions can be written as (8) with (5) reveals that the intensity of preference for quality that characterizes 11 the marginal consumer is higher in dual ownership than in sole ownership,
S D This implies that market coverage is lower with dual ownership than with sole ownership. Note that the maximization problems of the integrated and the dual monopolists are defined for arbitrary quality levels, which do not have to be the same (but can be the same). Moreover, quality does not appear by itself in (5) and (8), since these are defined only in terms of market coverage. Thus, the comparison of market coverages across market structures, in (9), is not contingent on the quality being the same in the two cases. If we start with the same quality level in the two market structures, prices will be higher in independent ownership,
Lemma 1. The intensity of preference for quality that characterizes the marginal consumer in dual ownership is higher than in integrated
S D This double marginalization effect was first observed by Cournot (1927) .
9 This is in the Cournot tradition. Results are similar if prices are chosen sequentially. 10 The second order condition is equivalent to uf 9(u )/f(u ) . 2 4; it is clearly implied by the second order condition of joint ownership.
11 To prove this, evaluate ≠P / ≠p at the profit maximization condition of independent ownership:
Essentially, the root cause of the price difference is the inability of each of the dual monopolists to appropriate the full benefits of a decrease in its own price, which clearly the integrated monopolist is able to do.
Theorem 1 (Cournot) . If the quality level is the same under both ownership structures, the integrated (sole) monopolist will choose a lower price than the dual vertically-related monopolists.
Anticipating the equilibrium of the second stage, each firm chooses in the first stage the quality of its component. There is no point for either of the monopolists to choose a higher quality than that of the complementary good. Therefore, the dual monopolists set identical qualities, q 5 q 5 q . The particular level of q that A B they choose maximizes each firm's profits,
Let q be the quality choice of both firms; the implied market price for composite D good AB is p (q ). Finally, the equilibrium profits per firm are
Quality and welfare comparisons
We have already seen in Theorem 1 that, starting with the same quality level at the first stage of the game, the market of dual monopolists will have a higher price than that of the integrated sole monopolist. We now examine the incentives of firms to provide different quality levels in different ownership structures. For this, it is sufficient to examine the total impact of marginal quality changes, directly as well as indirectly through prices, to equilibrium profits in each ownership 12 structure.
* *
To evaluate the marginal effects of quality on profits dP /dq and d(P 1 S A * P )/dq we need to differentiate totally (6) and (12) and substitute the corre-B sponding dp / dq from total differentiation of the price first order conditions (5) and (8), respectively. We first find dp / dq. In both (5) and (8), price p influences the * profit maximization condition only through u . Thus, for both (5) and (8) we find 13 that 12 Since both ownership structures have the same cost structure, the direct impact of quality change on costs is the same in both ownership structures. Any difference will have to arise from the different effects of quality changes on price in the two ownership structures. 13 * For example, naming R( p,q) the expression of the first order condition (5), R( p,q) 5 1 2 F(u ) 2 * * * * u f(u ), and applying the implicit function theorem, we have dp /dq 5 2 [(≠R / ≠u )(≠u / ≠q)] / [(≠R / * * * dp /dq 5 2 (≠u / ≠q)/(≠u / ≠p) 5 u .
*
Although the formula for u is the same, the impact of quality improvements, starting from the same quality level, is different in the two regimes. This is * because u is different in each case because equilibrium prices differ. Under dual * ownership, price is higher, market coverage is lower, and u is higher. Thus, for dual ownership, quality improvements have a bigger impact on price. We focus next on the impact of quality changes on profits.
To see the impact of quality improvements on profits in each ownership 14 * * * structure, we evaluate dP /dq and d(P 1 P )/dq: S A B * 9 9 * 9 9 dP /dq 5 (dp /dq
S A B A B * * * 9 9
d(P 1 P ) / dq 5 2 dP /dq 5 (dp /dq)D 2 f (q) 2 f (q)
A B * * 9 9
The integrated monopolist realizes the highest possible profits in the absence of price discrimination, * * * P . P 1 P . In combination with (14) and (15), this implies that, for any q,
S A B Thus, marginal improvements in quality have a bigger positive impact on revenues and profits under sole monopoly than under dual monopoly. This is because the sole monopolist is able to appropriate all the revenue benefit of an increase in quality, while dual monopolists only keep part of the revenue increase. Since quality improvements have a bigger impact on profits for the sole monopolist, he chooses a higher quality level. Formally, on the assumption that the equilibrium profits are concave in quality choice, it follows from (17) that the equilibrium quality is higher for the integrated monopolist, q . q . This result can also be explained through an analysis of the strategic impact of quality improvements. We have shown that, compared to the case of integrated monopoly, because of double marginalization, in dual ownership, marginal 15 increases in quality have a bigger impact on price. Being able to sell the same quality at a higher price than under integrated monopoly, the dual monopolists choose a lower quality level, which is less costly to produce. Of course, the dual monopolists do not realize higher profits than in sole ownership, since their prices are too high because of double marginalization.
The lower market coverage with dual ownership established in Lemma 1 directly implies that, from the point of view of the consumers, dual ownership is Pareto inferior to sole ownership. A consumer with u , u is indifferent across 
Theorem 3. The sole ownership equilibrium is Pareto superior to the subgameperfect dual ownership equilibrium for both consumers and firms.
Because prices for the same quality are higher under dual ownership while quality is lower in that regime, there can be no general deduction about the comparison of equilibrium prices. However, the next section shows that, for a wide class of cost functions and any distribution of preferences, the equilibrium price is higher in bilateral monopoly than in integrated monopoly.
Price comparisons for power cost functions
Suppose that the fixed costs of quality are a power function of q, f (q) 5 A a f (q) 5 cq / 2, so that the cost of producing both components is f (q) 1 f (q) 5 B A B a cq , a . 1. We will show that for exponents a > 2, the price for the composite good under dual ownership is higher than under sole monopoly, despite the provision of a lower quality level under dual ownership.
We have established the marginal relationship between quality and price at the price equilibrium in both ownership structures as dp /dq 5 p /q.
Solving this as a differential equation we have
*
where the k 5 u is defined by (5) in sole ownership as k , and by (8) in dual S ownership as k :
As we have shown earlier, k , k .
S D
The quality choice in each regime is defined by the solution of (14) and (15), respectively. By inspection of (14) and (15) we note that, at each of these choices, for the class of cost functions considered in this section, market-wide equilibrium revenues in each regime are proportional to quality, a a
Eliminating the price between (21) and (22), we define the equilibrium quality as a function of k (k or k ):
where v ; (ac) . Then the equilibrium price is
Differentiating p with respect to k we have
In view of (59) and (89), dp /dk . 0 for a > 2 for k [ [k ,k ) , and exceptionally S D dp /dk 5 0 at k 5 k when a 5 2. Since k , k , it follows from (25) 
Extensions
All results can easily be extended to n . 2 complementary products combined in fixed proportions. The calculations for the integrated monopolist do not change except for the extra fixed costs for each of the n components. Price equilibrium for disintegrated monopolists is similar, with n substituted for 2 in Eq. (8): argument of Theorem 2, proving that quality is lower in disintegrated ownership, again can easily be replicated for n complementary goods. Similarly, the welfare comparisons of Theorem 3 follow directly. Finally, the argument for Theorem 4 also follows in the same manner as for two firms; thus price is also higher for disintegrated monopolists with power functions as fixed costs of quality. The results can also be extended to other specifications of the composite good's quality as a function of the qualities of the components. The minimum function, min(q , q ), is the limit of a constant elasticity of substitution function as the of substitution s 5 1/(1 2 r). It is easy to show that the limit as s → 0 (equivalently as r → 2`) of this CES function is the minimum function. By continuity, all results established for the minimum function hold for the CES function with small elasticity of substitution s.
Concluding remarks
We have discussed the effect of vertical integration of two monopolists on the quality level of composite goods. The effects of the lack of vertical integration on price are known. The interesting result established here is that lack of vertical integration leads to a reduction in quality, lower market coverage, and smaller consumer surplus and profits. These results do not arise from a lack of coordination between the disintegrated (dual) monopolists in the choice of quality, since they both choose the same quality level. Instead, the difference of quality between the two ownership structures arises out of the change of the strategic incentives implied by the different ownership structures. In disintegrated ownership, quality improvements have a bigger impact on price; thus, firms save on quality costs by choosing a lower quality while achieving the same impact on price.
We also proved for a wide class of cost functions and any distribution of consumers that, despite the provision of a lower quality level, disintegrated monopolists will charge a higher price, in comparison with a vertically integrated monopolist. Finally, the results of this paper were established in a framework of no economies of scope and no costs of coordination. Introduction of either economies of scope or costs of coordination would strengthen our results.
An interesting question for further research is the extent that these results can be generalized in other market structures, where there is a degree of competition in the market for each component. In the presence of competition, the issue of quality choice is more complicated since vertically integrated firms have the option to produce components that are totally or partially incompatible with products (or components) of competitors, thereby foreclosing or disadvantaging competitors. Under these circumstances, a vertically integrated firm with significant market power in the market for at least one of the components may also have incentives to raise the costs of rivals in one or both markets by either degrading quality or 18 creating incompatibilities. Thus, in the presence of competition, strategic decisions of quality provision should be analyzed in conjunction with decisions on 19 the degree and extent of compatibility.
18 See Economides (1997) . 19 For a comprehensive discussion of compatibility and related issues, see Economides (1996) .
